| Liberals against Terrorism and the TerrorWiki are a collaborative online effort to shape a more liberal strategy for defeating terrorism and Islamist radicalism. |
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Does Husain Haqqani Read LaT?The Chef's professor joins the rapidly-growing "hold Bush accountable for his rhetoric" faction. And he offers some concrete ideas for the road ahead:
Zayn Al Abidin Al Rukabi, writing in the London-based Al Sharq Al Awsat, suggests that Bush's inaugural address gave his administration "a unique chance, the best ever, to restore trust in true US values, as well as improving an image which has been distorted by its mistakes." But, to seize that chance, Bush will have to find a way to match his words with deeds. He might begin by refusing to allow America's Muslim allies to define democratic progress as cosmetic political changes, such as the creation of rubber-stamp parliaments and the holding of fixed elections. Mubarak, for example, claims that Egypt has been engaged in a gradual transition to democracy for over two decades. As a result, his country receives considerable aid for civil society projects despite little true reform. Muslim liberals understand that temporary alliances with autocrats are sometimes necessary even for democracies. But a friendly dictator should be called just that, and not described as the builder of a future democracy. Another practical step could be active U.S. engagement with opposition leaders and parties in Islamic countries. The United States could bolster Egypt's conservative Al Wafd party, the newly formed liberal Al Ghad party, and the Islamic democrats in the officially unrecognized Al Wasat party--as well as the popular civilian parties in Pakistan that Musharraf accuses of misgoverning the country before he took power. Since the days of Iran's shah, authoritarian Muslim rulers have demanded that the United States shun their opposition as the price of their alliance, and the United States has obliged them. Administration officials and diplomats try to avoid high-profile meetings with opposition leaders in Washington and abroad for fear of antagonizing U.S.-friendly dictators. Furthermore, democracy-promotion assistance is almost never extended to political parties or media that might threaten existing regimes. Changing this policy would allow U.S. nongovernmental organizations, such as the National Democratic Institute, to use money from the U.S. Agency for International Development to provide logistical help for political party-building activities similar to those undertaken in Eastern Europe and Latin America. To be sure, it would provoke the occasional heated exchange between the regimes and American diplomats. But it is unlikely that regimes like Mubarak's and Musharraf's would withhold cooperation from the United States (and forgo the benefits in economic and military aid) because of increased U.S. engagement with their opposition. And engagement might eventually give Washington's democrats an alternative to dealing with the world's dictators. |